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This paper investigates the impact of mis-specifying the market demand process on a serially
linked two-level supply chain. Box-Jenkins models are used to represent both the true and
a mis-specified market demand processes. It is shown that the impact of mis-specification
on cost is minor if the supply chain tries to minimise the market demand forecast errors.
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that mis-specification does not always result in additional
costs. A managerial insight is revealed; poor forecast accuracy is not always bad for the total
supply chain costs. In other words, employing more accurate forecasting methods may actually
result in higher total supply chain costs.
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1 Introduction
A typical and common concern for managers is to minimise demand forecast errors in order
to avoid unnecessary supply chain costs. To minimise forecast errors, some knowledge of
the demand process is essential. For example, if the demand process can be represented in
a mathematical form, such as the Box-Jenkins Model (Box et al., 1994), managers can use
conditional expectation to create a Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE) forecast. There
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are many supply chain studies that take this approach to represent a market demand process
and use conditional expectation as a forecasting method (e.g. Graves, 1999; Lee et al., 2000;
Gilbert, 2005; Hosoda and Disney, 2006). Many of these studies assume that the Order-
Up-To (OUT) policy is exploited in a supply chain, the true demand process structure and
the true values of parameters of the market demand process are correctly known and an
MMSE forecast is employed to determine the OUT level. However, in real supply chains
due to a lack of familiarity of the Box-Jenkins technique and the high level of skill required
to use it, simple forecasting methods, such as Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA), are still quite popular (see, McCarthy et al., 2006, for example), even though the
importance and the usefulness of correctly identifying the true demand process might be
realised among managers. Thus there are many opportunities to suffer from demand process
mis-specification in real supply chains.
Demand process mis-specification is not a new research topic, but it does appear to be
relatively under researched. To the best of our knowledge, Badinelli (1990) may be the first
to research this topic. More recent papers were produced by Kim and Ryan (2003) and
Zhang (2004). All of these studies have used the Box-Jenkins model to represent the market
demand process and have quantified the cost of using the EWMA forecasting technique.
This research differs from these prior works in two ways.
First, we will consider the situation that the forecasting method used by a supply chain
is conditional expectation. However, the market demand process is mis-specified. The
forecast actually used by a supply chain, therefore, is not the “correct” MMSE forecast. The
motivation of this setting came from the fact that generating “correct” MMSE forecasts may
be difficult due to a lack of skills and knowledge of the Box-Jenkins approach. Furthermore,
since the true market demand process is unknown to everybody, assuming that the demand
process is mis-specified may be a better representation of reality.
Secondly, we will consider a two-level supply chain and the reason of this is that one
of our interests is to quantify the impact of mis-specification on a multi-level supply chain.
From prior work, such as Badinelli (1990), we can reasonably conjecture that a forecast
based on a mis-specified demand process would have a negative impact on the first level
player in a supply chain, since the forecast accuracy directly increases the inventory cost.
Through the first level player’s ordering policy, this impact is then transfered to the second
level player. This is because the first level’s ordering decision is, in part, based on the
mis-specified demand process. The second level then generates a forecast of the demand
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from the first level, again using conditional expectation. This generated forecast is, however,
also affected by the shared, but incorrect, knowledge given by the first level on the demand
process structure. Therefore, the second level has also suffered from mis-specification and
its performance has also been affected.
It is shown that even if the market demand process is mis-specified, as long as the supply
chain tries to minimise forecast errors the impact from mis-specification on the supply chain
cost is minor. Furthermore, we highlight a counter-intuitive conclusion; market demand pro-
cess mis-specification does not always increase the supply chain costs. Indeed, by exploiting
mis-specification, the supply chain can reduce both supply chain inventory costs and the
production costs simultaneously.
This paper is organised as follows. After the literature review shown in Section 2, the an-
alytical model is described in Section 3. Via numerical analysis some interesting managerial
insights are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Literature Review
It has been long recognised that the forecasting method has an impact on the performance of
an ordering policy, and there are many studies that analyse the impact of forecasting methods
assuming that the true market demand process is unknown or ignored (see, Badinelli, 1990;
Chen et al., 2000; Xu et al., 2001; Kim and Ryan, 2003; Zhang, 2004, for example). Badinelli
(1990) analyses the impact of the market demand mis-specification using a single level supply
chain model with the OUT policy. Demand is assumed to be a general ARMA process.
Badinelli provides an analytical model for the no mis-specification case. Using exponential
smoothing, the impact of mis-specification is quantified via numerical analysis. Badinelli
concludes that the market demand mis-specification results in a higher inventory cost.
Assuming an AR(1) demand process and a demand process with a linear trend, Chen
et al. (2000) study the impact of using EWMA and the Moving Average (MA) forecasting
methods on the bullwhip effect. They conclude that the smoother the market demand
forecast, the lower the bullwhip effect. Xu et al. (2001) and Kim and Ryan (2003) both study
a two-level supply chain model where each player adopts EWMA forecasts even though an
AR(1) market demand process is assumed. After quantifying the cost of mis-specification
of the forecast model, they investigate the benefit of an information sharing strategy by
measuring the bullwhip (Xu et al., 2001) and forecast errors generated (Kim and Ryan,
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2003). In terms of information sharing, Xu et al. (2001) assume the smoothing constant in
EWMA used at the retailer is shared with the supplier, and Kim and Ryan (2003) assume the
market demand information is exchanged. Kim and Ryan (2003) report that the cost impact
of mis-specification on the first level player sometimes shows “strange and unexpected”
patterns. Using a single level supply chain model, Zhang (2004) analyses the impact of
forecasting methods on the bullwhip effect using MA in addition to EWMA and MMSE
forecast methods when the market demand follows an AR(1) process. It is concluded that
an MMSE forecast yields the minimum inventory cost. EWMA and/or MA forecasting may,
however, outperform the MMSE when the demand process is not well specified.
After showing the benefit of sharing the market demand information in a two-level supply
chain using a real set of data, Hosoda et al. (2008) discuss a potential impact of the market
demand mis-specification on the benefit of information sharing. In their model, an MMSE
forecasting method is used. They suggest that the market demand mis-specification does
affect the magnitude of the benefit coming from the information sharing strategy, and in
an extreme case, mis-specification can eliminate this benefit. Watson and Zheng (2007)
consider the situation where the true market demand process is known but the forecasts
of the demand are affected by a manager’s subjective bias. They quantify its impact on
the bullwhip effect and the inventory cost in a single-level supply chain. It is shown that
under-reaction to the change in the demand can mitigate the bullwhip effect. In Hosoda and
Disney (2009), from the point of the total supply chain cost, two different two-level supply
chain settings are investigated. In both settings, the OUT policy is used at each level of the
supply chain. In the first setting, it is assumed that the OUT level is updated every time
period by using an MMSE forecast. In the second setting, the OUT level is determined based
on a mean of the demand that is time invariant. An AR(1) process is used to represent the
demand. It is shown that the second setting can yield lower supply chain cost, expecially
when the market demand is positively correlated over time.
3 The Model
A serially linked two-level supply chain system is analysed. We assume that up-to-date mar-
ket demand information and the mis-specified knowledge of the demand process captured by
the first level player is shared and is common knowledge in the supply chain. This assump-
tion enables us to negate the benefit coming from sharing the market demand information.
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Figure 1: Two-level supply chain model
Therefore, the supply chain under investigation is a vertically integrated two-level supply
chain. It is assumed that each player cooperates to minimise the total supply chain cost and
the benefit generated by the cooperation will be reallocated to ensure that each player is
better off. Thus, there is no conflict in the supply chain. For convenience, we call the first
level player, the retailer and the second level player, the manufacturer. Both players exploit
a periodic review system, and the replenishment lead-time is constant and known. Fig. 1
shows a schematic of our two-level model. In what follows, the details of our model will be
described.
The ordering policy used herein is the OUT policy. The OUT level is adjusted in each
time period according to the latest demand forecast. The market information sharing scheme
is assumed. The knowledge about the market demand process captured by the retailer is
shared with the manufacturer. In addition, the manufacturer has access to the most recent
instance of the external market demand. The cost parameters and the ordering policies in
the supply chain are common knowledge. We assume that the true market demand process
is unknown; however, the mean level is known2. The market demand is unintentionally mis-
specified by the retailer, and this mis-specified knowledge of the market demand process is
shared with the manufacturer and exploited by both players.
2This assumption is set according to the fact that the estimation of unbiased value of the mean is less
problematic than that of the whole Box-Jenkins model.
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3.1 Sequence of Events and Costs
The sequence of the events at period t in the model is as follows: at the beginning of
the period t, the retailer receives its order placed L1 periods ago, O(t − L1), from the
manufacturer, where L1 = 1, 2, . . . includes both the review period and the transport delay
between the manufacturer and the retailer. The retailer then observes and fills the market
demand, D(t). Unmet demand is backlogged. At the end of the period, the retailer updates
its OUT level, S1(t), with incorrect knowledge of the market demand process. Then the
retailer places an order to the manufacturer, O(t). The manufacturer receives this order
without information delay. From its on-hand inventory, the manufacturer ships the order to
the retailer immediately after observing O(t). Using knowledge of the mis-specified market
demand process and the shared value ofD(t), the manufacturer updates the forecast and then
adjusts its OUT level, S2(t). Then to maintain its inventory position, S2(t), the manufacturer
makes a production request, P (t). After L2(= 1, 2, . . .) time periods, P (t) will be completed
and ready for filling orders from the retailer. At the end of each period, the retailer incurs a
holding cost (h1) per unit of on-hand inventory plus a backlog cost (b1) per unit of backlogged
demand. The manufacturer is charged a holding cost (h2) per unit of on-hand inventory at
the end of each period. In this paper, the expediting strategy is assumed as in Lee et al.
(2000) and Gavirneni (2006). Therefore, if the manufacturer cannot meet all the demand
from the retailer, unmet demand is filled by an external source. Only the manufacturer incurs
this expediting cost, b2. The manufacturer’s production line has a time invariant standard
capacity, G. When the volume of the production request, P (t), exceeds G, the manufacturer
will run its production line in over-time to meet the full demand and be charged an extra
overwork cost (w) per period for each product over the capacity G. In the case that P (t)
is lower than G, the production line is not fully utilised, and the manufacturer incurs an
opportunity cost (u) per period for each unit of production below the capacity G. It is also
assumed that infinite raw material is available for production.
3.2 Market Demand
A first-order auto-regressive and moving average process, ARMA(1, 1), will be used to
represent the unknown true external demand,
D(t+ 1) = µ+ ρ (D(t)− µ) + ε(t+ 1)− θ ε(t), (1)
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where µ is the known mean of the demand, ρ and θ are the unknown auto-regressive and
the moving average parameters respectively. ε(t) is an unknown normally distributed “white
noise” element in period t with the mean of zero and the standard deviation of σε. It is
assumed that µÀ 4σε so that negative demand is extremely rare (Johnson and Thompson,
1975). Details of an ARMA(1, 1) process are described in Box et al. (1994). For stability,
the values of ρ and θ should be |ρ| < 1 and |θ| < 1, respectively. Note that by setting θ = 0,
an ARMA(1, 1) process becomes an AR(1) process. Literature supports our ARMA(1, 1)
and AR(1) demand process assumption. For instance, Lee et al. (2000) present evidence that
market demand processes for a real supermarket are positively correlated over time. Using
a real set of demand data from a retail supply chain, Hosoda et al. (2008) provide examples
of AR(1) consumer demand processes in a retailer and ARMA(1, 1) demand processes in
a supplier. Disney et al. (2006) show that the demand processes for Procter & Gamble
products can be modelled as an ARMA(1, 1) process. These papers suggest that, the most
of the time, the value of ρ is positive. Therefore we mainly focus on the case of 0 < ρ < 1.
It is assumed herein that due to a lack of skill and knowledge, a time series data ana-
lyst mis-specified the true market demand process and believes that D(t) follows an AR(1)
process,
D(t+ 1) = µ+ β (D(t)− µ) + ξ(t+ 1), (2)
where β and ξ(t) are the autoregressive parameter and the error term in period t respec-
tively. It is assumed that |β| < 1. In this research, we have assumed that by analysing the
historical market demand data, the retailer believes that (2) is the true process of the market
demand, and this knowledge and the estimated value of β are shared with the manufacturer.
Therefore, the manufacturer also believes that the market demand process can be described
as (2) and exploits this knowledge to determine its own OUT level.
Generally, when the value of |θ| is much smaller than the value of |ρ| (i.e. |θ| ¿ |ρ|), an
ARMA(1, 1) process becomes quite similar to an AR(1) process. Therefore, assuming that
the market demand process tends to be mis-specified in a practical setting where |θ| ¿ |ρ|,
this research will focus on the situation that the value of θ is quite small. From (1) and (2),
ξ(t) can be written as
ξ(t) = (ρ− β)(D(t− 1)− µ) + ε(t)− θ ε(t− 1).
We can see that E[ ξ(t) ] = 0, irrespective of the value of β. In addition, since ξ(t) contains
both ε(t) and ε(t − 1), ξ(t) is not an i.i.d. process anymore. If the value of |θ| is small,
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however, ξ(t) might be mis-specified as an i.i.d. process. This tricks the supply chain into
believing that its forecast is a correct MMSE forecast. This also supports our assumption
that when the value of θ is small, mis-specification tends to occur.
3.3 Ordering Policy and Performance Measures
The ordering policy for the retailer is
O(t) = D(t) + (S1(t)− S1(t− 1)),
S1(t) = DˆL1(t) + z1 · σNS1 ,
where DˆL1(t) is an MMSE forecast of the market demand over the lead-time plus review
period, L1, made at period t. σNS1 is the long-run standard deviation of the end of period
net stock levels at the retailer. z1 is a predetermined constant that is selected to minimise
the retailer’s inventory costs. The inventory balance equation for the retailer is
NS 1(t) = NS 1(t− 1) +O(t− L1)−D(t),
where NS 1(t) is the retailer’s net stock level at the end of period t. The value of NS 1(t) can
be negative and in such a case NS 1(t) represents the retailer’s backorder level. The retailer’s
expected inventory cost at the end of each period can be represented as
CNS1 = h1E
[(
NS 1(t)
)+]
+ b1E
[(
−NS 1(t)
)+]
. (3)
Here ( x )+ is the maximum operator, that is, max( 0, x ). The minimised value of CNS1 ,
C∗NS1 , can be obtained from the classical newsvendor problem and is C
∗
NS1
=
(
h1 · z1+(h1+
b1) · L(z1)
)
σNS1 , where z1 = Φ
−1
(
b1/(b1 + h1)
)
for the standard normal distribution Φ and
L(·) is the standard loss function.
Similarly, the production request policy used by the manufacturer is
P (t) = O(t) + (S2(t)− S2(t− 1)),
S2(t) = OˆL2(t) + z2 · σNS2 ,
where OˆL2(t) is an MMSE forecast of the retailer’s order over the lead-time plus review
period (L2), made at period t. σNS2 is the stable standard deviation of the end period net
stock levels at the manufacturer. z2 is a predetermined constant selected to minimise the
manufacturer’s inventory costs. The inventory balance equation for the manufacturer is
NS 2(t) = NS 2(t− 1) + P (t− L2)−O(t),
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where NS 2(t) is the manufacturer’s net stock level at the end of period t. The manufacturer’s
expected inventory cost at the end of each period can be written as
CNS2 = h2E
[(
NS 2(t)
)+]
+ b2E
[(
−NS 2(t)
)+]
, (4)
and the minimised value of CNS2 is C
∗
NS2
=
(
h2 · z2 + (h2 + b2) · L(z2)
)
σNS2 , where z2 =
Φ−1
(
b2/(b2 + h2)
)
. We can express CP , the manufacturer’s expected production cost, as
CP = uE
[(
G− P (t)
)+]
+ wE
[(
P (t)−G
)+]
. (5)
The classical newsvendor procedure can also be used to obtain C∗P , the optimal value of CP
that minimises the sum of overwork and opportunity costs. It provides C∗P =
(
u · zP + (u+
w) · L(zP )
)
σP , where zP = Φ
−1
(
w/(w + u)
)
and σP is the long-run standard deviation of
P (t).
It should be noted that in our model the costless return assumption is needed (see, Lee
et al., 1997; Dong and Lee, 2003, for example). This allows O(t) and P (t) to be negative.
Negative values of O(t) or P (t) would occur when the sum of the on-hand inventory and the
work-in-progress is higher than the target OUT level. In such a case, the excess inventory
does not move out of a current stock point but is considered as the upstream player’s inven-
tory and will stay there until being used as part of a future replenishment. However, if we
assume that µO À 4σO and µP À 4σP (where µO and µP are the means of O(t) and P (t)
respectively, and σO is the standard deviation of O(t)), we may reasonably expect that the
possibility of negative values of O(t) or P (t) is quite rare.
From the model, the transmission of the impact of mis-specification over the supply chain
can be described as follows. Firstly, the market demand mis-specification directly affects the
values of the forecasts, DˆL1(t) and OˆL2(t). Then, these forecast values affect the volume of
the order, O(t) and P (t) via S1(t) and S2(t), respectively. O(t) and P (t) affect the value of
σP , which in turn affects C
∗
P in a linear fashion. Through the inventory balance equations,
O(t) and P (t) also influence the values of σNS1 and σNS2 . These two standard deviations
affect respectively C∗NS1 and C
∗
NS2
, in a linear manner as well.
To quantify the impact of mis-specification, analytical expressions for σNS1 , σNS2 and σP
will be provided in the next section. In what follows, since means do not affect the values
of the standard deviations, we set µ = 0 without loss of generality to ease the mathematical
exposition.
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3.4 Variances and Standard Deviations
From our definition, σNS1 and σNS2 represent the stable long-run standard deviations of
the net stock levels at the end of each period when the market demand is mis-specified;
σNS1 refers to the retailer and σNS2 to the manufacturer, respectively. As shown in Vassian
(1955) for a single level and Hosoda and Disney (2006) for a multi-level supply chain, when
the OUT policy is exploited, the net stock level at the end of period t is identical to the
forecast error over the lead-time made at t− L. L(= 1, 2, . . .) is the lead-time including the
review period. This characteristic is valid irrespective of the forecasting method used. This
knowledge allows us to employ the forecast errors over the lead-time to obtain analytical
expressions of σNS1 and σNS2 , instead of considering NS 1(t) and NS 2(t) directly. In our
experience, this method easily yields analytical expressions of the standard deviations of net
stock levels which are often quite complicated. By using the forecast errors, the analytical
expressions for σ2NS1 and σ
2
NS2
are obtained as
σ2NS1 =
(θ − ρ)2 (ρ− β(1 + βL1(ρ− 1)) + (β − 1)ρL1+1)2
(β − 1)2(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ) σ
2
ε +(
β(βL1 − 1)
β − 1 +
(θ − ρ)(ρL1 − 1)
ρ− 1
)2
σ2ε + σ¯
2
NS1
, (6)
σ2NS2 =

2(θ − ρ)(θρ− 1)×(
1 + β2 + βL1+2(ρ− 1)(1 + βL2−1)+
ρL2−1
(
β + βL1+1(ρ− 1)− ρ) (1 + β1+L1+L2(ρ− 1)− βρ)
)
+
β2(1+L1)(ρ− 1)2 (2θρ− 1− θ2) (1 + β2L2)+
2β (2θρ(1 + ρ2)− (θ − 1)2 − (1 + θ)2ρ2)−
2β1+L1(ρ− 1)((1− θ)2 + θ(1− ρ)2)(1 + β1+L2)

(β − 1)2(ρ− 1)3(1 + ρ) σ
2
ε +
2(θ − 1)ρL1(ρ− θ)(ρL2 − 1) + (θ−ρ)2ρ2L1 (ρ2L2−1)
1+ρ
(1− ρ)3 σ
2
ε + σ¯
2
NS2
, (7)
where σ¯2NS1 and σ¯
2
NS2
are the values of σ2NS1 and σ
2
NS2
when there is no demand process
mis-specification3. The detailed process to obtain these expressions is shown in Appendix 1.
Note that since an unbiased estimator for σNS1 is obtainable from the historical data of the
net stock levels, {NS i(t),NS i(t−1), . . . |i ∈ 1, 2}, it is assumed herein that even though they
do not know the RHS’s of (6) and (7), both the retailer and the manufacturer do know the
3In (7), when ρ = 0 and L2 = 1, the value of ρL2−1 should be set to unity.
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values of σNS1 and σNS2 . They can then exploit these values to establish safety stock levels
via the newsvendor approach. From (6), we have the following property.
Property 1 When |ρ| < 1, |θ| < 1 and |β| < 1, we have σNS1 ≥ σ¯NS1.
Proof 1 The first two terms in (6) are never negative.
From Property 1, we can conclude that if the market demand is mis-specified, the inventory
cost for the retailer is never lower than that in the no mis-specification case, since the
retailer’s inventory cost is linear in σNS1 . Therefore, demand process mis-specification never
reduces the retailer’s inventory cost. Notice from (6) that only when ρ = β and θ = 0 or
ρ = θ and β = 0, does σNS1 = σ¯NS1 (that is, the retailer’s inventory cost will not increase).
The first case is obviously, as it is the case when there is no mis-specification. The second
case is also a no mis-specification case because an ARMA(1, 1) process with ρ = θ is identical
to an i.i.d. white noise process (Box et al., 1994), and the MMSE forecast for an i.i.d. white
noise process can be achieved by setting β = 0. Therefore, when ρ = β and θ = 0 or ρ = θ
and β = 0, the market demand is correctly specified, and the forecast given by the supply
chain is the MMSE forecast.
On the other hand, σNS2 can be either smaller or greater than σ¯NS2 . For example, consider
the case: ρ = 0.7, θ = 0.1, σε = 10, L1 = 3, and L2 = 4. Here, the value of σ¯NS2 is 51.4.
If the supply chain chooses β = 0.6, σNS2 = 48.8. If, however, β = 0.7 is chosen, then the
value of σNS2 increases to 52.5. This will be explored further in the next section.
Recall σP is used to represent the stable standard deviation of the production request,
P (t). If the process of P (t) can be expressed as a Box-Jenkins model, σP can be obtained
easily. As shown in Appendix 1, P (t) can is an ARMA(1, 2) process, and σ2P is
σ2P =
 1 + θ2 − 2θρ +2β(θ − ρ)(1− θρ) + β2(1 + θ2 − 2θρ)−
2βL1+L2+1(βL1+L2+1 − 1− β)(ρ− 1)(1 + θ + θ2 − θρ)

(β − 1)2(1− ρ2) σ
2
ε . (8)
Note that it is assumed that the manufacturer does not know the RHS of (8). However, the
manufacturer does have easy access to an unbiased estimator of σ2P from historical data of
P (t), {P (t), P (t− 1), . . .}.
Property 2 When ρ, θ, σε and β are given, σP is a function of L1 + L2 and the impact of
L1 on σP is identical to that of L2, irrespective of demand mis-specification.
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Proof 2 The proof is omitted since it is straightforward from (8) and (10) in Appendix 1.
The production cost is linear in σP when CP = C
∗
P . Thus we can conclude that not only does
shorter L2, but also shorter L1 (which is usually not under control of the manufacturer but
is under control of the retailer) reduces the production cost, irrespective of market demand
mis-specification.
Property 3 1) When |ρ| < 1, |θ| < 1 and 0 ≤ β < 1, σP is increasing in β, and 2) when
|ρ| < 1, |θ| < 1 and |β| < 1, the value of β which minimises σP is negative.
Proof 3 The proof is given in Appendix 2.
The first part of Property 3 suggests that if the current value of β used in the supply chain
is positive, setting β = 0, the value of σP will be lower, which results in a lower production
cost. Note that when β = 0, the ordering/production request policies used by the supply
chain become the classical base stock policy which has a time invariant OUT level. The
proof is shown in Appendix 3. One of the interesting characteristics of the classical base
stock policy is that the order process given by this policy is identical to the demand process
(see, Chen, 1999, for example). Therefore, if the supply chain sets β = 0, both O(t) and
P (t) will have the same ARMA(1, 1) structure as D(t), and there is no bullwhip effect. A
similar discussion can be seen in Lee et al. (2000). The second part in Property 3 means that
if minimisation of σP is the first priority for the supply chain, a negative value of β should
be considered, even though the true value of ρ is positive. However, in a practical setting,
since the supply chain does not know (8), and thus does not know values of ρ, θ and σε, it
may not be easy to find the exact value of β that minimises σP .
From the properties shown above, the following points have grabbed our attention. Prop-
erty 1 suggests that if the market demand is mis-specified, σNS1 will always increase. An
interesting point is that how much the impact of the market demand mis-specification is
on the cost when the supply chain chooses the value of β which minimises forecast errors.
If the amount of the cost increase is minor, we may conclude that the impact of the mis-
specification is negligible. If not, avoiding the demand process mis-specification would be a
critical issue for managers, and to achieve this, a certain amount of investment in forecast-
ing systems might be necessary. Another interesting observation is that by exploiting the
market demand mis-specification intentionally, the supply chain may be able to reduce its
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Figure 2: Values of σNS1 when |β| < 1, θ = 0.1 and L1 = 5
total costs. For example, since a value of β can decrease the value of σP , we may reason-
ably expect that the supply chain can reduce its production cost, even though the retailer’s
inventory cost will increase under such a condition. Furthermore, it might be possible that
the benefit coming from the production cost is large enough to compensate for the increased
inventory cost. To explore further details of the impact of mis-specification, we will now
resort to numerical analysis due to the complexity of equations (6), (7) and (8).
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, two scenarios are investigated to verify properties and to illustrate the impact
of market demand mis-specification. The first scenario will consider the case when β is chosen
to minimise σNS1 . This is identical to the standard deviation of the market demand forecast
error over L1 time periods. We consider this scenario a representative of a typical attitude
of a real world retailer. In the second scenario we will assume that the supply chain will
manipulate β to control the dynamics of the supply chain. In other words, β is considered
to be a controllable variable that is exploited to achieve a lower total supply chain cost. In
both scenarios, the following cost parameters are assumed; h1 = 2, b1 = 50, h2 = 1, b2 = 25,
u = 2 and w = 50. Lead-times are L1 = 5 and L2 = 5. We focus on the case in which
0 < ρ < 1, |θ| ¿ ρ and |β| < 1. For the true market demand, we assume that σε = 10. In
what follows, we will use the parameter settings shown above unless otherwise noted.
13
Hosoda, T. and Disney, S.M., (2009), “Impact of market demand mis-specification on a two-level supply chain”, 
International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 121, No. 2, pp739–751. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.04.024.
4.1 Scenario 1: Minimising the retailer’s forecast error
Fig. 2 shows the values of σNS1 for each value of ρ when |β| < 1, θ = 0.1 and L1 = 5. Observe
that there is a unique value of β that minimises σNS1 for each value of ρ and we call that value
β∗NS1 . Table 1 shows β
∗
NS1
and each cost (C∗NS1 , C
∗
NS2
and C∗P ), together with corresponding
costs of the no mis-specification case, when 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.9 and θ = −0.1 and 0.1. As we
expect, C∗NS1 in the case of the demand mis-specification is higher than that in the case of no
mis-specification for all settings. However, the other two costs show a different pattern. In
some cases mis-specification yields higher costs and in other cases they can lower. In terms of
the total cost, when θ = −0.1, the total costs for the mis-specified case are always lower than
those for the no mis-specification case. On the other hand, when θ = 0.1, the total cost for
the mis-specification case is higher than that for no mis-specification case. All in all, however,
the difference of each cost between the mis-specification case and the no mis-specification
case is rather small. From Table 1, we can also conclude that if the supply chain employs
β∗NS1 , the impact of the market demand mis-specification on total cost is minor. Demand
mis-specification always increases C∗NS1 ; however, its impact on the total cost is quite small.
Furthermore, Table 1 suggests that there is a possibility that demand mis-specification may
actually reduce the total cost. This leads to our next interesting question: Can the supply
chain reduce its total cost by manipulating β ? Scenario 2 will consider this question.
4.2 Scenario 2: Manipulating the value of β
In this scenario, we vary the value of β to analyse its impact on the supply chain costs. Fig.
3 shows the impact of β on the total cost, C∗NS1 + C
∗
NS2
+ C∗P . In Fig. 3, the cost when
the market demand is correctly specified is also indicated (shown as “No mis-specification”
in the graph). Clearly, the total cost is affected by the value of β. The values of β that
minimise the total cost, β∗total, are always −1 < β∗total < ρ and in many cases the values are
negative. Only when the value of ρ is large (i.e. ρ = 0.9) does β∗total have a large positive
value.
Table 2 shows the results under the same parameter setting as in Fig. 3 with β∗total used
for the mis-specification case, and the results of no mis-specification case for comparison. It
shows that the total cost of mis-specification case (B) is always lower than that of the no
mis-specification case (A). When θ = 0, since the market demand process becomes an AR(1)
process, setting β = ρ yields the no mis-specification case. Table 2 shows, however, that
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Table 1: Impact of β∗NS1 on the total supply chain cost
ρ 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
θ = −0.1 θ = 0.1
Mis
β∗NS1 0.356 0.535 0.719 0.906 0.226 0.452 0.674 0.892
C∗NS1 138 173 224 298 117 147 191 256
(1.00) (1.00 ) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
C∗NS2 77 107 167 301 62 86 135 251
(1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (1.00)
C∗P 67 93 151 310 56 79 132 289
(0.99) (0.98) (0.97) (0.94) (1.00) (1.01) (1.03) (1.07)
Total cost 282 373 542 909 235 312 458 796
(1.00) (0.999) (0.992) (0.98) (1.00) (1.00) (1.01) (1.02)
No mis
C∗NS1 138 173 224 297 117 147 191 256
C∗NS2 76 106 166 301 62 87 137 251
C∗P 68 95 156 328 56 78 128 271
Total cost 282 374 546 926 235 312 456 778
Mis: Mis-specification case
No mis: No mis-specification case
( · ): Ratio to the corresponding value of no mis-specification case
even if θ = 0, the value of β∗total is far from ρ. Furthermore, together with the results of no
mis-specification case shown in Table 2, Fig. 3 suggests that even if β is not exactly equal to
β∗total, by exploiting demand mis-specification, the supply chain can achieve lower total cost,
especially when 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.7 (although more care has to be taken when ρ = 0.9). Table 2
also suggests that the value of β∗total is affected by the value of θ. As the value of θ increases,
the value of β∗total decreases.
Let’s consider the relationship between the total inventory cost, C∗NS1 + C
∗
NS2
, and the
production cost, C∗P . Fig. 4 illustrates the relationship between those two costs. It is
suggested that the supply chain can reduce both the total inventory cost and the production
cost simultaneously by changing a value of β, which should be smaller than the value of ρ.
In most cases, setting β = 0 can reduce both the total inventory cost and the production
cost at the same time. Fig. 4 also suggests that when ρ is a large value (e.g. ρ = 0.9), the
value of β should be about 0.8 to avoid higher inventory costs.
All these findings suggest that 1) the market demand mis-specification does not always
increase the total supply chain cost, and 2) even though the true values of ρ and θ are
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Figure 3: Impact of β on the total cost when 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.9 and −0.1 ≤ θ ≤ 0.1.
Table 2: Costs for no mis-specification and mis-specification cases
No mis-spec. case Mis-spec. case
ρ θ C∗NS1 C
∗
NS2
C∗P TC (A) β
∗
total C
∗
NS1
C∗NS2 C
∗
P TC (B) B/A
0.3 −0.1 138 76 68 282 −0.485 144 68 40 253 0.895
0.0 128 69 62 259 −0.539 133 63 38 234 0.899
0.1 117 62 56 235 −0.587 121 57 35 213 0.905
0.5 −0.1 173 106 95 374 −0.244 186 90 49 325 0.869
0.0 160 96 87 343 −0.324 171 82 45 298 0.870
0.1 147 87 78 312 −0.408 156 74 42 272 0.873
0.7 −0.1 224 166 156 546 0.164 255 132 69 456 0.836
0.0 207 151 142 500 0.091 235 120 63 418 0.836
0.1 191 137 128 456 −0.003 216 108 57 381 0.836
0.9 −0.1 297 301 328 926 0.702 356 268 164 788 0.850
0.0 276 276 299 851 0.673 335 244 148 727 0.854
0.1 256 251 271 778 0.633 316 219 133 668 0.859
TC: Total Cost
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Figure 4: Impact of β when 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.9 and θ = 0.1
unknown, by exploiting a small value of β, (β = 0, for example), the total supply chain cost
can be reduced. Setting β = 0 means sacrificing MMSE forecasting and employing instead
the classical base stock policy with a time invariant OUT level, as shown in Appendix 3.
It should be noted that when ρ is negative, even if β∗total is used in the supply chain, the
total supply chain cost in the case of mis-specification could be higher than that in the case
of no mis-specification. Some results are shown in Appendix 4. For example, when ρ = −0.7
and θ = 0.1, the value of β∗total is −0.752 and the total cost ratio (= B/A) becomes 1.026.
This fact can be explained as follows. It is well known that when ρ is negative and the market
demand is specified correctly, there is no bullwhip effect in a supply chain (see, Kahn, 1987,
for example). Therefore, the total cost in the case of no mis-specification is quite low and
the power of β to control the supply chain cost is not strong enough to outperform the no
mis-specification case.
From Table 2, it can be seen that C∗P is the major contributor to the lower total cost in
the case of mis-specification. Since C∗P is affected by not only σP but also both u and w,
we have used different values of u and w to analyse the impact of these cost parameters on
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Table 3: Impact of u and w on on each cost when ρ = 0.7 and θ = 0.1
u = 2 u = 1 u = 5
w = 50 w = 25 w = 25
Mis-specification case
β∗total −0.003 0.206 −0.208
C∗NS1 216 209 221
C∗NS2 108 110 107
C∗P 57 31 93
Total cost 381 351 420
No mis-specification case
C∗NS1 191 191 191
C∗NS2 137 137 137
C∗P 128 64 221
Total cost 456 392 549
the total cost. Fig. 5 and Table 3 provide the results for when ρ = 0.7 and θ = 0.1. Fig. 5
shows that the value of β∗total tends to be smaller (or more negative) as u is larger. This may
be because when u is large, σP should be smaller to minimise the impact of this large value
of u on the total cost. A smaller value of σP can be achieved by using a small value of β, as
shown in Property 3. With the aid of Fig. 5 and Table 3, it can be seen that setting β = 0
can bring the benefit for the total supply chain, irrespective of the values of u and w.
Fig. 6 shows the impact of the lead-time on the total cost and illustrates that the smaller
L1+L2 leads to the lower total costs. The difference between two cases where L1+L2 = 15
comes from the total inventory cost, since from Property 2, the production cost, C∗P , is the
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Figure 6: Impact of L1 and L2 on the total cost
same for both cases. Fig. 6 suggests that when L1 + L2 is constant, smaller L1 (or larger
L2) can result in lower total costs. Again, we can see that β = 0 is not a bad alternative.
The numerical analysis shown herein highlights the following operational insights. Al-
though true values of ρ and θ are not known, by using a small value of β, the supply chain
can reduce its total cost in most cases. A guideline we suggest is as follows: if the value of ρ
is considered 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.7 and the value of θ is quite small, set β = 0. That is, by using the
classical base stock policy the supply chain can reduce its cost (see, Fig. 3 − Fig. 6). If the
supply chain can reasonably assume that ρ is about 0.9, using a large value of β (β = 0.6 or
0.7) can achieve lower total cost (see, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). If it is known that the value of ρ is
a small value (i.e. 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.5), negative value of β should be considered to minimise the
total cost (see, Table 2). In the case of negative ρ, mis-specification may not bring benefit
to the supply chain (see, Table 4 in Appendix 4).
5 Conclusion
Assuming the true stochastic nature of the market demand process is unknown, we have
analysed the impact of market demand process mis-specification on the costs in a serially
linked two-level supply chain. We have shown that the impact of the demand process mis-
specification on the costs is minor if a supply chain tries to minimise market demand forecast
errors. Furthermore, by exploiting demand process mis-specification, a supply chain can
reduce both the inventory cost and the production cost simultaneously. A “rule of thumb”
for the selection of the value of β is presented. The managerial insight derived from our
study is that poor forecasts are not always bad from a total supply chain cost viewpoint. Poor
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forecasts always increase the first-level player’s inventory cost. However, the cost reduction
generated at the second-level player can be large enough to compensate for the increase at
the first-level. This managerial insight can be restated; employing more accurate forecasting
methods may actually result in higher total supply chain costs. It is possible that a supply
chain who has mis-specified the market demand process may be enjoying a lower cost at the
second-level unintentionally. And it is also possible that if such a supply chain incorporates
a more accurate forecasting method, only the inventory cost at the first-level is guaranteed
to decrease. The cost at the second-level, however, may increase. This may result in a higher
total supply chain cost. Therefore, when a supply chain considers changing its forecasting
method to a more accurate one, it should be very careful. The result of improving forecast
accuracy may mean that the supply chain loses hidden benefits and incurs new additional
costs.
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Appendix 1: The variances
No Mis-Specification Case
In the no mis-specification case, the supply chain knows the true structure and the values of
parameters of the market demand process. Under this condition, the MMSE forecast is
DˆL1(t) = E
[
L1∑
i=1
D(t+ i)
∣∣∣D(t), ρ, θ, ε(t)]
= ρ(1 + ρ+ · · ·+ ρL1−1)D(t)− θ(1 + ρ+ · · ·+ ρL1−1)ε(t)
=
1− ρL1
1− ρ (ρD(t)− θεt)
= ΛL1 (ρD(t)− θεt) ,
where ΛL1 = (1 − ρL1)/(1 − ρ). Vassian (1955) and Hosoda and Disney (2006) have shown
that the value of the net stock variance is identical to the variance of the forecast error over
the lead-time. By exploiting this, we can obtain the long-run variance of the net stock levels
at the retailer when the demand process is specified correctly, σ¯2NS1 , as follows.
σ¯2NS1 = E
[
Var
[
L1∑
i=1
D(t+ i)− DˆL1(t)
]]
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=L1∑
i=1
(1 + i∑
j=2
(ρ− θ)ρj−2
)2σ2ε
=
(
L1(θ − 1)2(ρ2 − 1)+
(ρ− θ)(ρL1 − 1)(θ(1 + 2ρ− ρL1) + ρ(ρL1 − 1)− 2)
)
(ρ− 1)3(1 + ρ) σ
2
ε .
As shown in Hosoda and Disney (2006), the OUT policy transforms an ARMA(1, 1) demand
process into another ARMA(1, 1) order process, which is
O(t+ 1) = ρO(t) + (1 + ρΛL1 − θΛL1) ε(t+ 1)− (θ + ρΛL1 − θΛL1) ε(t)
= ρO(t) + εo(t+ 1)− θo εo(t),
where εo(t) = (1+ρΛL1−θΛL1)ε(t) and θo = (θ+ρΛL1−θΛL1)/(1+ρΛL1−θΛL1). Therefore,
since the demand for the manufacturer is also an ARMA(1, 1) process (as it was for the
retailer), the same approach used to obtain σ¯2NS1 can be used to obtain σ¯
2
NS2
. The result is
σ¯2NS2 =
(
L2(θo − 1)2(ρ2 − 1)+
(ρ− θo)(ρL2 − 1)(θo(1 + 2ρ− ρL2) + ρ(ρL2 − 1)− 2)
)
(ρ− 1)3(1 + ρ) σ
2
εo
=
(
L2(θ − 1)2(ρ− 1)+
2(θ − 1)ρL1(ρ− θ)(ρL2 − 1) + (θ−ρ)2ρ2L1(ρ2L2−1)
1+ρ
)
(ρ− 1)3 σ
2
ε , (9)
where σ2εo is the variance of εo(t). Since O(t) is an ARMA(1, 1) process and the manufacturer
uses the OUT policy for its production request, P (t) is also an ARMA(1, 1) process and is
described as
P (t+ 1) = ρP (t) + (1 + ρΛL2 − θoΛL2) εo(t+ 1)− (θo + ρΛL2 − θoΛL2) εo(t)
= ρP (t) + εp(t+ 1)− θp εp(t).
Here ΛL2 = (1−ρL2)/(1−ρ), εp(t) = (1+ρΛL2−θoΛL2)εo(t) and θp = (θo+ρΛL2−θoΛL2)/(1+
ρΛL2 − θoΛL2). Generally, once an ARMA(1, 1) process is described as (1), its variance can
be obtained as (1 + θ2 − 2θρ)σ2ε/(1 − ρ2) (Box et al., 1994). From this knowledge, we can
easily obtain the variance of P (t), σ¯2P , and it is
σ¯2P =
2ρ2(L1+L2)(θ − ρ)2 + (θ − 1)2(1 + ρ) + 2ρL1+L2(θ − 1)(1 + ρ)(ρ− θ)
(ρ− 1)2(1 + ρ) σ
2
ε . (10)
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Mis-Specification Case
Since the retailer believes that the demand process is the AR(1) structure as shown in (2),
the MMSE forecast of the lead-time demand made by the retailer at period t, DˆL1(t) can be
written as
DˆL1(t) = E
[
L1∑
i=1
D(t+ i)
∣∣∣ D(t), β]
= E
[
β(1 + β + · · ·+ βL1−1)D(t) +
L1∑
i=1
L1−i∑
j=0
βjξ(t+ i)
]
= β(1 + β + · · ·+ βL1−1)D(t)
= β Λ
′
L1
D(t), (11)
where Λ
′
L1
= (1− βL1)/(1− β). Similar to the no mis-specification case, we will exploit the
forecast errors over the lead-time to obtain σ2NS1 .
σ2NS1 = E
[
Var
[
L1∑
i=1
D(t+ i)− DˆL1(t)
]]
=
L1∑
i=1
(1 + i∑
j=2
(ρ− θ)ρj−2
)2σ2ε +
(
(ρ− θ)(1 + ρ+ · · ·+ ρL1−1)− β 1− β
L1
1− β
)2
σ2ε +
(ρ− θ)2
1− ρ2
(
ρ(1 + ρ+ · · ·+ ρL1−1)− β 1− β
L1
1− β
)2
σ2ε
=
(θ − ρ)2 (ρ− β(1 + βL1(ρ− 1)) + (β − 1)ρL1+1)2
(β − 1)2(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ) σ
2
ε +(
β(βL1 − 1)
β − 1 +
(θ − ρ)(ρL1 − 1)
ρ− 1
)2
σ2ε + σ¯
2
NS1
.
In the setting that both the retailer and the manufacturer believe that the market demand
process is an AR(1) process, the retailer’s ordering process that the manufacturer expects
can be written as
O(t) = D(t) + β Λ
′
L1
(
D(t)−D(t− 1)
)
= β D(t− 1) + ξ(t) + β Λ′L1
(
β D(t− 1) + ξ(t)−D(t− 1)
)
= βL1+1D(t− 1) + (1 + βΛ′L1)ξ(t)
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= βL1+1D(t− 1) + (1− βL1+1)/(1− β)ξ(t)
= βL1+1D(t− 1) + Λ′L1+1ξ(t), (12)
where Λ
′
L1+1
= (1 − βL1+1)/(1 − β). Therefore, the forecast used by the manufacturer, the
conditional expectation of (12) over the L2 time periods is given by
OˆL2(t) = E
[
L2∑
i=1
O(t+ i)
∣∣∣ D(t), β]
= E
[
βL1+1(1 + β + · · ·+ βL2−1)D(t) +
L2∑
i=1
((
Λ
′
L1+1
+
L2−1−i∑
j=0
βL1+1+j
)
ξ(t+ i)
)]
= βL1+1(1 + β + · · ·+ βL2−1)D(t)
= βL1+1 Λ
′
L2
D(t), (13)
where Λ
′
L2
= (1− βL2)/(1− β). In our model, it is assumed that the manufacturer exploits
(13) believing that it provides MMSE forecasts. However, the actual process of O(t) is
different from (12). Using (1), the actual process of O(t) when the retailer mis-specified the
market demand process can be written as
O(t) = D(t) + βΛ
′
L1
(
D(t)−D(t− 1)
)
= D(t) + βΛ
′
L1
D(t)− βΛ′L1D(t− 1) (14)
= ρ
(
D(t− 1) + βΛ′L1(D(t− 1)−D(t− 2))
)
+(
1 + βΛ
′
L1
)
ε(t)−
(
θ + βΛ
′
L1
θ + βΛ
′
L1
)
ε(t− 1) + βΛ′L1θε(t− 2)
= ρO(t− 1) +
(
1 + βΛ
′
L1
)
ε(t)−(
θ + βΛ
′
L1
θ + βΛ
′
L1
)
ε(t− 1) + βΛ′L1θε(t− 2), (15)
which is an ARMA(1, 2) process. From (1), (13) and (14), we can find σ2NS2 . This is identical
to the variance of the forecast error over the L2 time periods.
σ2NS2 = E
[
Var
[
L2∑
i=1
O(t+ i)− OˆL2(t)
]]
=
(
1 + βΛ
′
L1
)2
σ2ε +
L2∑
i=2
(
1 + ρi−2(1 + βΛ
′
L1
)(ρ− θ) + (ρ− θ)
i∑
j=3
ρj−3
)2
σ2ε +((
ρΛL2 + βΛ
′
L1
(ρL2 − 1)− βL1+1Λ′L2
)
− θ
(
ρL2−1(1 + βΛ
′
L1
) +
L2∑
i=2
ρi−2
))2
σ2ε +
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(
ρΛL2 + βΛ
′
L1
(ρL2 − 1)− βL1+1Λ′L2
)2
(ρ− θ)2
1− ρ2 σ
2
ε . (16)
By simplifying (16), we can have (7). Using (13) as its forecasting method together with the
observed demand (15), the manufacturer places a production request, P (t), which is
P (t) = O(t) + βL1+1Λ
′
L2
(
D(t)−D(t− 1)
)
= ρ
(
O(t− 1) + βL1+1Λ′L2(D(t− 1)−D(t− 2))
)
+
(
1 + βΛ
′
L1
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
)
ε(t)−(
θ + βΛ
′
L1
θ + βΛ
′
L1
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
θ
)
ε(t− 1) +(
βΛ
′
L1
θ + βL1+1Λ
′
L2
θ
)
ε(t− 2)
= ρP (t− 1) +
(
1 + βΛ
′
L1
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
)
ε(t)−(
θ + βΛ
′
L1
θ + βΛ
′
L1
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
+ βL1+1Λ
′
L2
θ
)
ε(t− 1) +(
βΛ
′
L1
θ + βL1+1Λ
′
L2
θ
)
ε(t− 2). (17)
(17) shows that P (t) is an ARMA(1, 2) process as is O(t). Generally, when an ARMA(1, 2)
process defined as
P (t) = ρP (t− 1)− θ0ε(t)− θ1ε(t− 1)− θ2ε(t− 2),
where θ0, θ1 and θ2 are moving average parameters, its variance is given by
σ2ε
1− ρ2
(
(θ20 + θ
2
1 + θ
2
2) + 2ρ (θ0θ1 + θ2(ρθ0 + θ1))
)
. (18)
From (17) and (18) and after algebraic simplification, we obtain (8).
Appendix 2: Property 3
Property 3 can be proven by considering the derivative of σ2P with respect to β and showing
that (∂σ2P)/(∂β) is positive for |ρ| < 1, |θ| < 1 and 0 ≤ β < 1.
(∂σ2P)/(∂β) can be written as
∂σ2P
∂β
=
(
2
(
1 + L12βL12+1 − (L12 + 1) βL12
)×(
2βL12+1 − β − 1) (1 + θ2 + θ(1− ρ))
)
(β − 1)3 (1 + ρ) σ
2
ε ,
where L12 = L1 + L2. For |ρ| < 1 and 0 ≤ β < 1, it is easy to check
2βL12+1 − β − 1 ≤ 2β − β − 1 = β − 1 < 0,
(β − 1)3 < 0,
1 + ρ > 0.
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Since 0 < 1− ρ < 2, when 0 ≤ θ < 1, we have
1 + θ2 + θ(1− ρ) > 0,
and when −1 < θ < 0, we have
1 + θ2 + θ(1− ρ) > 1 + θ2 + 2θ = (1 + θ)2 > 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that when |ρ| < 1 and |θ| < 1, 1 + θ2 + θ(1− ρ) is positive.
For convenience, we set
f(β) = 1 + L12βL12+1 − (L12 + 1) βL12 ,
and will show that f(β) in non-negative. Differentiating f(β) with respect to β yields
∂f(β)
∂β
= L12 (L12 + 1) βL12 − L12 (L12 + 1) βL12−1 ≤ 0.
Therefore, since 0 ≤ β < 1, the minimum value of f(β) is achieved when β → 1:
min f(β) = lim
β→1
f(β) = 0.
This shows f(β) > 0 when 0 ≤ β < 1, and thus (∂σ2P )/(∂β) > 0. Therefore, since (∂σ2P)/(∂β)
is still positive when β = 0, we can conclude that the value of β which minimises the value
of σ2P should be negative. ¤
Appendix 3: Classical Base Stock Policy, β = 0
By using the recursive characteristic of D(t) given in (2), the total demand over the L1 time
periods can be written as
L1∑
i=1
D(t+ i) = µ · L1 + β 1− β
L1
1− β (D(t)− µ) +
ε(t+ L1) + (1 + β)ε(t+ L1 − 1) + · · ·+
(1 + β + · · ·+ βL1−1)ε(t+ 1). (19)
Taking the expected value of (19) yields the forecast model used by the retailer. When the
retailer sets β = 0, the expected value of (19) becomes µ · L1. Therefore, when β = 0, S1(t)
is given by
S1(t) = µ · L1 + z1 · σNS1 ,
which is the time invariant base stock level used in the classical base stock policy. Using
this method it can be shown that the ordering policy used by the manufacturer is also the
classical base stock policy when β = 0. ¤
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Appendix 4: The Case where ρ is not Positive
Table 4 shows the results of cases where the value of ρ is not positive. The values of other
parameters used herein, such as cost parameters and lead-times, are the same as in Table
2. Note that when ρ = 0 and θ 6= 0, the true market demand process becomes an MA(1)
process. If ρ = θ = 0, it becomes an i.i.d. white noise process. Even though an i.i.d. case,
mis-specification can bring some benefits to the supply chain, since the value of B/A is less
than unity (see Table 4). When −0.9 ≤ ρ ≤ −0.3, most of the time β∗total does bring benefit to
the supply chain, but in some settings, it does not. All in all, however, the benefit or the loss
for the total supply chain cost due to the mis-specification is quite minor. Therefore, when ρ
is non-positive, intentional exploitation of the mis-specification is not strongly recommended.
Since true values of ρ and θ are not known, finding β∗total may not be easy. Even if the exact
value of β∗total is obtainable, the benefit might be quite small, or there may be no benefit.
Table 4: Costs when ρ is non-positive
No mis-spec. case Mis-spec. case
ρ θ C∗NS1 C
∗
NS2
C∗P TC (A) β
∗
total C
∗
NS1
C∗NS2 C
∗
P TC (B) B/A
0 −0.1 105 53 48 206 −0.637 107 50 33 190 0.924
0.0 97 49 43 189 −0.663 99 46 31 176 0.932
0.1 89 44 39 172 −0.683 91 42 30 163 0.945
−0.3 −0.1 85 41 37 163 −0.696 86 39 29 154 0.947
0.0 79 37 33 149 −0.708 80 36 28 144 0.960
0.1 73 34 30 137 −0.717 74 33 27 134 0.979
−0.5 −0.1 76 36 32 144 −0.719 77 34 27 138 0.962
0.0 71 32 29 132 −0.726 71 32 26 129 0.979
0.1 66 29 26 121 −0.731 67 29 26 122 1.003
−0.7 −0.1 71 31 29 131 −0.744 71 30 26 127 0.976
0.0 67 28 26 121 −0.749 67 28 26 121 0.997
0.1 64 25 24 113 −0.752 64 26 26 116 1.026
−0.9 −0.1 71 28 42 141 −0.789 73 27 29 129 0.910
0.0 70 26 43 139 −0.792 72 25 30 127 0.912
0.1 68 24 45 137 −0.794 71 23 31 125 0.914
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